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The fifth anniversary of the Ukraine-NATO Charter on special partnership will be
marked on July 9, 2002, with a special meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission.
NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson will take part in the meeting.
Ukraine has approached the fifth anniversary of the Charter with a declared intent to
deepen its relations with NATO. On May 23 the National Security and Defense Council
announced the decision to begin developing a national strategy with the utmost goal of
Ukraine joining the NATO-based European collective security system. NSDC Secretary
Yevhen Marchuk, who announced the decision, did not explicitly state that joining
NATO should be Ukraine’s strategic goal. That goal was formulated later by President
Leonid Kuchma and deputy secretary of the NSDC Serhiy Pirozhkov. Within the recent
weeks, Pirozhkov repeatedly stated that Ukraine viewed the process of Euro-Atlantic
integration (used as a euphemism for «joining NATO») as an integral part of the general
strategy of European integration of Ukraine.
An indication of the efforts to promote relations along the Ukraine-NATO line (but not
vice versa) can be seen in the fact that within a few recent weeks both Minister of
Foreign Affairs Anatoly Zlenko and Minister of Defense of Ukraine Volodymyr
Shkidchenko visited Brussels. Several conferences, seminars and roundtables were
organized in Kyiv to address possibilities to bring the Ukraine-NATO and Ukraine-EU
relations to a new quality in the context of NATO enlargement and the new format of
Russia-NATO relations.
Noteworthy, Russia’s reaction to Ukraine’s efforts to change its status in relations with
NATO was unusually calm, while reaction of the West was practically non-existent – a
few official greetings and not a single statement that would contain anything specific.
That reaction, apparently, is linked to the general perception of Ukraine in the world.
Ukraine, in its turn, made a rather radical statement. «Further preservation of the non-
block status is of no prospect for Ukraine, [and] in some cases harmful», said NSDC
Secretary Yevhen Marchuk (Den, May 24, 2002). In his view, «it will be dangerous for
Ukraine, to a certain extent, to stay alone, for there is a huge collective security system
around us». The point is that on May 28, the NATO-Russia Council, or «the twenty» was
created at the NATO-Russia summit in Rome. The proposal to establish such a body was
announced by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in December 2001. Therefore, Russia
got the right not only to engage in consultations, but to take part in the decision-making
process on some specific issues – primarily, the fighting against international terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crisis management, peace-keeping,
countering consequences of natural disasters, preventing technogenic catastrophes,
fighting against organized crime and similar issues. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary
General Lord George Robertson warned against too much optimism about «the twenty»
and suggested that the whole idea of the structure might fail if the Council failed to
elaborate common decisions and would transform into a discussion club. Moscow
officials also argue that the future of the «twenty» will depend on what it involves and
stress that Russia is still negative about NATO’s eastward enlargement. Because of the
disagreement with the whole enlargement idea, Russia’s leader will not take part in the
NATO summit in Prague in November. It is expected that the November summit will
officially invite new members and announce a program of transformation of NATO from
a military-political alliance into a transatlantic security mechanism. Politicians and
experts in Russia argue that for Moscow relations with the United States are more
important today than relations with NATO.
The US-Russian relations, indeed, have reached a new quality after September 11. The
change is seen as the result of Vladimir Putin’s correctly chosen policy after September
11 and his success in using all possibilities for establishing strategic relations with the
West in general by proving that Russia is a major force and possesses sufficient resources
to ensure its is treated as such.
The relations between Russia and the European Union have also become noticeably
warmer since early 2002. Instead, Ukraine’s relations with the West in general remain at
a level unacceptably low for a country that has chosen integration to the European Union
as its strategic goal. Hence, it may be said that the effort to boost relations between
Ukraine and NATO and the EU occurs in the circumstances of Russian policy’s
movement towards partnership with the West and clearly indicated interest of both parties
to pursue a closer relationship. Meanwhile, Russian leadership continues to claim it does
not intend to seek membership either of NATO or the EU. (By the way, Zbigniew
Brzezinski once told Italian «La Stampa» that he would not exclude a possibility that
Russia might join NATO in the future.)
Meanwhile, Ukraine, like five years ago, tries to give a boost to its relations with NATO
and attract the West’s attention by emphasizing the «Euro-Atlantic vector» that has been
rather successful so far. The NATO leadership has never voiced any criticism regarding
Ukraine’s democratic development problems during the period of mild but steady
diplomatic isolation of Ukraine by the West following the Gongadze case, the «tapegate»
and the refusal of the Ukrainian leadership to settle the political crisis the way such crises
are settled in democratic states. NATO has never voiced any comments on that; instead, it
was always stated that NATO-Ukraine cooperation was developing exceptionally well.
Although President Leonid Kuchma stressed that «while competition is an absolutely
necessary prerequisite for ensuring economic movement, in the field of inter-state
political relations it is important to strongly counter any temptation of rivalry» (Interfax-
Ukraina, May 28, 2002), the campaign in the Ukrainian press before the announcement of
the decision of the National Security and Defense Council on May 23 and after it showed
that a do9minating motivation was not to lag behind Russia in the rapprochement with
the West. «How could that happen that Russia will come to NATO earlier than you?» a
journalist of the Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung was wondering.
Obviously, Ukraine does not claim Western attention (not just in NATO) equal to the
attention Russia gets. After all, Kyiv has always been aware of the difference between the
two countries in many respects and prospects, primarily when it comes to strategic issues
of security. The «predecessor» of the NATO-Russia «twenty», the Foundation
Document, signed in 1997 (that failed in 1999 under the NATO operation in the former
Yugoslavia) meant much more for global security, was deeper in terms of contents and
essence that the NATO-Ukraine Charter. The present-day situation, when it was NATO
that offered Russia the creation of a common body for common decision-making but
simultaneously refrained from anything more meaningful than the promise of deeper
consultations and making no signals that could be interpreted as welcoming, may be
rather painful for Kyiv.
Foreign Factors
The Russian factor has been mentioned above. Neither the Russian leadership nor experts
of leading think tanks (with the exception of representatives of various political forces
represented in the Russian Duma) expressed negative views regarding Ukraine’s declared
plans for a new relationship with NATO. Members of the Ukrainian establishment deny
that the issue of Ukraine’s movement towards NATO was agreed on with Russia. A high-
ranking Ukrainian diplomat argued that Russia’s policy had changed in a sense that now
Russia is also inclined to search for constructive solutions but not on fundamental
provisions. The diplomat also added that notwithstanding the fact that NATO’s door
remains open for any country that belongs to the North-Atlantic region and meets the
necessary criteria, nowadays only «one and a half» among the NATO members fully
support Ukraine’s intentions. By the way, speaking about the open door: a leading
advisor to NATO leadership confirmed that the door exists, but that is a door of a railway
car, and the train moving.
Representatives of the leadership of the Alliance confirm that there is no consensus on
the Ukraine issue. Indirectly, in unofficial talks, they suggest that, first, Ukraine does not
enjoy the sufficient level of trust as to its ability to pursue a consistent policy that will not
be influenced by a possible change of the government and the president. It is also hinted
that the West does not trust President Leonid Kuchma and his inner circle that currently
have all (official as well as shadow) power in Ukraine. The doubts shared by Western
institutions – NATO as well as the EU, and individual member states of the two alliances,
and the United States – are about the quality of democratic development, the building of
the state governed by the rule of law, economic transition, and the military reform.
Meanwhile, nobody denies that Ukraine has the right to apply officially for NATO
membership once it meets the required criteria.
Noteworthy, senior NATO officials suggest that – should Ukraine’s application for
membership be submitted and considered – the issue of the Black Sea Fleet on the
Ukrainian territory will be only of secondary importance, if at all. According to an
adviser to the NATO Secretary General, nowadays Brussels does not discuss that issue at
all. According to Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National
Defense University Stephen Flanaghan, the issue of the Black Sea Fleet depend on what
sort of relations will be between NATO and the West and Russia at that time.
It is impossible today to guess what NATO’s reaction will be to a document that is being
prepared by the Ukrainian leadership as a sort of «attachment» to the Ukraine-NATO
Charter. The document was mentioned, among other things, by Deputy Secretary of the
NSDC of Ukraine Serhiy Pirozhkov at a recent international conference on Ukraine and
regional security cooperation, organized by NATO and the Center for European and
International Studies at the Institute of International Relations of the Kyiv National
University. Though, unofficial comments to that end make it possible to assume that the
reaction to the document will be rather skeptical. Meanwhile, it is possible that the
document will argue for a possibility for Ukraine to take part in the framework of the
Membership Action Plan, approved at the 1999 Washington summit – which itself cannot
guarantee that the invitation to join the Alliance will be made.
So far there has been no visible reaction to Ukraine’s suggestion that the West should
stop speaking about it as a «unique partner» and begin treating it just like any other
European state. Speaking to representatives of Ukrainian think tanks and the media some
time ago, chairman of the American NATO Committee Bruce Jackson said that Ukraine
is also a part of Europe, in the view of members of his influential association, and there is
a place for Ukraine in the European security system. In his opinion, the southern
dimension will be of major importance, and, possibly, it would be effective to link
NATO’s policy towards Ukraine with Turkey and Greece. Turkey, in his opinion, is
important because of the new major challenges to European security: the Caucasus, Iran,
the situation in Israel and the Balkans, and, it is possible that similar close relations might
be maintained with Ukraine for the same reason (Den, May 29, 2002). The importance of
Ukraine for NATO is in its military potential, and from the perspective of geography,
according to Stephen Flanaghan (Den, June 11, 2002).
As the relations between Russia and the West, primarily Russia and the USA, Ukraine
has lost the chance to capitalize only on its geopolitical situation. Because of the
extremely unsuitable domestic policy of the recent years Ukraine’s role has been reduced
to that of a second-rate player that does not attract much attention in the context of
changes in the global security system – be it organization of secure transportation routes
for energy sources supplied to Western Europe or alike. Notwithstanding Germany’s
successful experience of using Ukrainian cargo aircraft for transporting cargo to
Afghanistan during the anti-terrorist operation, countries of Western Europe rejected
services of Ukrainian cargo air carriers and do not consider a possibility of including
Ukraine in creation of the European rapid reaction forces. That suggests that today
Ukraine is not seen as a potential «member of the club» or an equal partner. Moreover,
NATO officials keep hinting that once the deep transformation of the Alliance is under
way, NATO may simply have no time for Ukraine. The NSDC’s statement of May 23 has
been seen so far by the Alliance and by analysts of the member states as an entirely
Ukrainian business.
Domestic Factors
There are a number of domestic factors, which – as admitted not just by the West but also
by Ukrainian state officials – hinder successful relations between Ukraine and the USA
and Ukraine and the European Union. Those factors do not allow a present-day Ukraine
to hope that its possible application for NATO membership will be unilaterally supported
by the members of the Alliance. The «mature democracies» do not trust the current
leadership of Ukraine due to the latter’s failure to abide by its promises and fulfill its
obligations – namely, democratization, reducing state interference with various spheres of
the society, and the lack of a clear and understandable foreign policy, to name but the
few.
NATO asks its potential candidates to comply with another specific requirement: a
candidate country should have completed an effective reform of the armed forces.
Reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine alone requires efforts and expenditures that until
recently have seemed incredible. According to NATO standards, defense spending of a
candidate state should comprise 2.5 percent of the country’s GDP. For a NATO member
state the figure is 3 percent of the GDP. To date Ukraine’s armed forces have been
«content» with 1.25 percent of the GDP. Experts believe that Ukraine will reach the
figure of 2.5 percent for its defense budget no earlier than in 5 or 6 years. It should also
be mentioned that Ukraine has Europe’s second largest armed forces, and Europe’s first
in terms of quantity of heavy armaments that are far from NATO standards. Moreover,
Ukraine still has to deal with the needs of 80 thousand houseless officers. Currently
NATO finances officer retraining programs to assist their adaptation to the civilian labor
market, but that support is obviously insufficient when a massive national program is
missing. The problem is likely to deteriorate if Ukraine pursues radical reduction of the
number of troops i9n active duty, which is required by the transfer to an effective
professional army. Another necessary condition is the transfer to civilian control over the
Armed Forces – something for which Ukrainian military establishment is not prepared
yet.
Representatives of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine admit that before
the NSDC decision to move towards joining NATO was announced on May 23, the
military had not received any tasks from the political leadership of the state regarding the
direction of the military reform and transition to the standards common for NATO
member states’ armed forces. Nowadays, only the units that have performed
peacekeeping operations under the NATO command are compatible with the NATO
standards.
One of the most important factors in the process of Ukraine’s approximation to NATO is
the people’s trust in their officials, the president, the parliament, and the government. The
levels of that trust today are very low – which is unlikely to inspire leaders of Western
states to support Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
The consensus of political forces, found in Ukraine’s neighbor states of Poland, Hungary,
Slovakia, and the Baltics in their movement towards NATO, still may be achieved in
Ukraine. For instance, none of the six major political forces represented in the parliament
declared in its election programs that Ukraine should be joining NATO. The Communist
party of Ukraine has gradually changed its radically negative view on NATO – probably,
influenced by the recent transformation of the Russia-NATO relations. Moreover, after
Belgrade applied for participation of Serbia and Montenegro in the Partnership for Peace
it became very difficult to accuse NATO referring to the Yugoslav campaign. Advocates
of the idea «To Europe with Russia» have not made their view on the situation clear,
either.
Another factor that for a while will play a negative role for the implementation of
Ukraine’s hopes is the low level of support in the Ukrainian society for the idea of
integration with NATO. The most optimistic of the public opinion survey results suggest
that no more than 30 percent of the population is supportive of the idea of Ukraine’s
application for NATO membership. Though, two years ago the proportion was lower.
One of the reasons for that attitude is the perception of the world by Ukrainians almost
exclusively depends on Russia’s information policy, when a professional information
policy and coverage of international events in Ukraine is insufficient, when even national
media lack professionalism. Hence, the public is uninformed about the price that Ukraine
will pay for joining (or not joining) NATO, about possible costs and benefits, about
prospects for, and challenges of joining the Euro-Atlantic community that after the
Prague summit will number at least 24 member states.
Hence, the chance that Ukraine has received – a potentially unique chance to come closer
to the West, primarily as a contributor to European security – may be wasted. For even
having done the massive «homework» Ukraine is not guaranteed a level of trust among
the potential Western partners needed for the beginning of the NATO accession process.
Meanwhile, ma new quality of relations with NATO could be used as the first step
towards closer integration into the European space.
